Morrill and Valentín in the paper "Computational coverage of TLG: Nonlinearity" considered an extension of the Lambek calculus enriched by a so-called "exponential" modality. This modality behaves in the "relevant" style, that is, it allows contraction and permutation, but not weakening. Morrill and Valentín stated an open problem whether this system is decidable. Here we show its undecidability. Our result remains valid if we consider the fragment where all division operations have one direction. We also show that the derivability problem in a restricted case, where the modality can be applied only to variables (primitive types), is decidable and belongs to the NP class.
The Lambek Calculus Extended by a Relevant Modality
We will introduce !L * -an extension of the Lambek calculus [9] with one modality, denoted by !. We consider the version of the Lambek calculus L * that allows empty left-hand sides of sequents (introduced in [10] ). Formulae of !L * are built from a set of variables (Var = {p, q, r, . . .}) using two binary connectives, / (right division) and \ (left division), and additionally one unary connective, !. Capital Latin letters denote formulae; capital Greek letters denote finite (possibly empty) linearly ordered sequences of formulae.
Following the linguistic tradition, formulae of the Lambek calculus (and its extensions) are also called types. In this terminology, variables are called primitive types.
We present !L * in the form of sequent calculus. Sequents of !L * are of the form Π → A, where A is a formula and Π is a finite (possibly empty) linearly ordered sequence of formulae. Π and A are called the antecedent and the succedent respectively.
Axioms and rules of !L * are as follows:
We call ! relevant modality, since it behaves in a relevant logic style, allowing contraction and permutation, but not weakening. Recall that in the original Lambek calculus there is neither contraction, nor permutation, nor weakening. The modality is introduced to restore contraction and permutation in a controlled way.
As we discuss in more detail in [7] , L * can be considered [1] [17] as a fragment of non-commutative variant of Girard's linear logic [5] . Our modality, !, follows the spirit of the exponential connective in linear logic, allowing contraction and permutation. However, in contrast with the linear logic case, we don't allow weakening. On the other hand, as we discuss in Section 2, our ! is motivated from the linguistical point of view.
We also consider fragments of !L * . Since there is no cut rule in this system, it enjoys the subformula property, and therefore if we restrict the set of connectives, we obtain conservative fragments of !L * : !L * / (where we have only / and !), L * (this is the "pure" Lambek calculus without !), L * / . Theorem 1. The derivability problem for !L * is undecidable. Moreover, the derivability problem is undecidable even for !L * / . Remark 1. !L * has been constructed as a conservative fragment of a larger system Db!?, introduced in [11] . Thus Theorem 1 provides undecidability of Db!? (solving an open question raised in [11] ).
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the spirit of our previous work [7] . The significant difference between this paper and [7] is that here the modality does not satisfy the weakening rule and the system !L * doesn't obey any version of Lambek's restriction (i.e., the antecedents are allowed to be empty). Therefore, we have to use a special relevant logic version of the deduction theorem (Theorem 5). We also had to open up and reassemble Buszkowski's proof from [2] and [3] to make it work without Lambek's restriction (in L * ).
Linguistic Examples and Motivations
In this section, we start from the standard examples of Lambek-style syntactic analysis [9] [4] and then follow [11] .
In syntactic formalisms based on the Lambek calculus and its variants, Lambek types (formulae) denote syntactic categories. We use the following standard primitive types: n stands for common noun (like "book" or "person"); np stands for noun phrase (like "John" or "the book"); s stands for the whole sentence. Actually, n and np represent not only isolated nouns and noun phrases, but also syntactic groups with similar properties: e.g., "the red book" or "the person whom John met yesterday," from the lingustic point of view, should be treated as a noun phrase (np) as well. The latter cannot be proved to be of type np by means of L * , but !L * can handle this.
For simplicity, in our examples we don't distinguish singular and plural forms.
Other parts of speech receive compound types: np \ s stands for intransitive verb (like "runs" or "sleeps"); (np \ s) / np stands for transitive verb ("likes," "reads," "met," "admire"); (np \ s) \(np \ s) is the type for adverbs like "yesterday" (it takes an intransitive verb group from the left-hand side and yields a compound intransitive verb group); np / n is the type for "the," etc.
If the sequent A 1 , . . . , A n → B is derivable in the Lambek calculus or its extension, syntactic objects of type A 1 , . . . , A n , taken together in the specified linear order, are considered to form an object of type B. For example, since (np \ s) / np, np / n, n → np \ s is derivable, "reads the book" is an expression of type np \ s, or, in other words, acts as a transitive verb. "the person whom John met"
As mentioned above, we want this phrase to receive type np. This is obtained by assigning type (n \ n) /(s / np) to "whom." "John met" has type s / np, which means "a sentence that lacks a noun phrase on the left-hand side." In other terms, we have a gap after "met." In Example 1 this gap is filled by "Pete," and here it is intentionally left blank.
"the person whom John met yesterday"
Here the gap appears in the middle of the clause (between "met" and "yesterday"), therefore "John met yesterday" is neither of type s / np, nor of type np \ s. This situation is called medial extraction and is not handled by L * .
To put np into the gap, we use ! and the (perm 1 ) rule:
The sequent on top is the same schema as for "John met Pete yesterday" (see Example 1).
Note that s / !np and !np \ s are equivalent (due to the permutation rules).
Example 4.
"the paper that John signed without reading"
Finally, this is the case called parasitic extraction, with two np gaps (after "signed" and after "reading"). If the that-clause were an independent sentence, the gaps would have been filled like this: "John signed the paper without reading the paper." To fill both gaps with the same np, we use the (contr) rule: Here "that" acts exactly as "whom," and "without" modifies the verb group like "yesterday" does, but also requires a noun phrase "reading the paper" on the right side. The sequents on the top are easily derivable in L * .
Remark 2. Our calculus !L * , as well as Db!?, works well for pure complex sentences and pure compound sentences. However, we meet with difficulties in the mixed case, caused by sophisticated nature of "and" and the like. For example, the fact that "John met Pete yesterday and Mary met Ann today" has type s, leads to and unwanted classification of *"the person whom John met yesterday and Mary met Ann today" as a noun phrase (type np), cf. Example 3. In order to address this issue, Morrill and Valentín [11] suggest another variant of the system, denoted by Db!? b . This variant includes brackets that disallow gapping in certain situations. Morrill and Valentín pose the decidability question both for Db!? and Db!? b . In this paper we solve the first question.
Remark 3. The whole system !L * turns out to be undecidable (Theorem 1). On the other hand, notice that in these examples and the like can be treated using types of a very restricted form. Namely, ! is applied only to a primitive type (for instance, !np). In Section 5 we show that this restricted fragment of !L * is decidable. Moreover, it belongs to NP, i.e., can be resolved by a nondeterministic polynomial algorithm.
L * with Buszkowski's Rules
In this section we generally follow the construction by W. Buszkowski from [2] . The formal difference is that in Buszkowski's paper the calculus is constrained by so-called Lambek's restriction: the antecedents of all sequents are forced to be non-empty. In this restricted version some sequents, even with non-empty antecedents, become underivable (e.g., q /(p / p) → q). In this paper we don't impose Lambek's restriction, and therefore cannot directly use results from [2] . However, as we show below, essentially Buszkowski's construction also works for L * .
Let L * + R be L * extended with a finite set R of rules of two special forms:
where p, q, r are given primitive types. We call these rules Buszkowski's rules.
is admissible in L * + R for an arbitrary set R of Buszkowski's rules.
Proof. We proceed by double induction. We consider a number of cases, and in each of them the cut either disappears, or is replaced by cuts with simpler cut formulae (A), or is replaced by a cut for which the depth of at least one derivation tree of a premise (Π → A or ∆ 1 , B, ∆ 2 → C) is less than for the original cut, and the cut formula remains the same. Thus by double induction (on the outer level-on the complexity of A, on the inner level-on the sum of premise derivation tree depths) we get rid of the cut. Case 1: A is not the type that is introduced by the lowermost rule in the derivation of ∆ 1 , A, ∆ 2 → C. In this case (cut) can be interchanged with that lowermost rule. Consider the situation when it was (B 1 ) (other cases are similar):
Case 2 for \ is handled symmetrically. Case 3: one of the premises of (cut) is the axiom (A → A). Then the goal coincides with the other premise.
Note that since (B 1 ) and (B 2 ) introduce new primitive types only to the antecedent, the "bad" case, where both premises of the cut rule are derived using Buszkowski's rules and the cut formula is the formula introduced by both of them, does not occur. This is the key trick that allows to formulate the extended calculus in a cut-free way.
In the presence of (cut) Buszkowski's rules (B 1 ) and (B 2 ) are equivalent to axioms p, q → r and p / q → r respectively, as shown by the following derivations:
and in the opposite direction:
From this perspective, L * + R can be viewed as a finite axiomatic extension of L * (with non-logical axioms of a special kind). However, for our purposes it is more convenient to consider rules instead of axioms.
Theorem 3. Let M be a recursively enumerable set of words over an alphabet Σ without the empty word. If Σ ⊂ Var, and Var also contains an infinite number of variables not belonging to Σ, then there exists a finite set R M of Buszkowski's rules and s ∈ Var such that for any word a 1 . . . a n over Σ
Proof. Any recursively enumerable language without the empty word can be generated by a binary grammar [3] . A binary grammar as a quadruple G = N, Σ, P, s , where N and Σ are disjoint alphabets (Σ is the original alphabet of the language), s ∈ N , and P is a finite set of productions of the form 1
where v 1 , v 2 , w ∈ N ∪ Σ. If (α ⇒ β) ∈ P and η and θ are arbitrary (possibly empty) words over N ∪ Σ, then ηαθ ⇒ G ηβθ. The relation ⇒ * G is the reflexivetransitive closure of ⇒ G . Finally, the language generated by G is the set of all words a 1 . . . a n over Σ such that s ⇒ * G a 1 . . . a n . Now let M be the language generated by a binary grammar G, and we construct the corresponding extension of L * . Let N ∪ Σ ⊂ Var, and let Var contain an infinite number of extra fresh variables that we'll need later. For every production (w ⇒ v 1 v 2 ) ∈ P we add one rule
For productions of the form v 1 v 2 ⇒ w the construction is more complex. First for every pair p = (v 1 v 2 ⇒ w), x , where (v 1 v 2 ⇒ w) ∈ P and x ∈ N ∪ Σ, we introduce new variables y p for every y ∈ N ∪ Σ and five extra variables a p , b p , c p , e p , f p . Then for every p we add the following rules. Some of these rules are not in Buszkowski's form. We'll transform them into the correct format below.
As already said, some of these rules are not actually Buszkowski's rules. However, any rule of the form
(these are rules (2 p ), (4 p ), (5 p ), and (6 p )) can be equivalently replaced by two rules
where u is a fresh variable. Similarly, (3 p ) is a shortcut for three rules:
Rules (1 p ), (7 p ), and (E) are already in the correct format. Thus we've actually constructed a calculus of the form L * + R. Denote it by L * + R M . Now to achieve our goal it is sufficient to prove the key lemma:
Proof. ⇐ All types in the sequent z 1 , . . . , z m → x are primitive, therefore its derivation includes only axioms and Buszkowski's rules, but not original rules of L * ((→ /), (→ \), (/ →), (\ →)).
Since e p , f p , and y p (for all y ∈ N ∪ Σ, including w) do not appear in the succedents of goal sequents in Buszkowski's rules from R M , the only possible situation when e p , f p , or y p actually appears in the succedent is the axiom. Hence rules (1 p )-(5 p ) can be rewritten in a simpler way (rules (6 p ) and (7 p ) are not affected by this simplification):
Proceed by induction on the cut-free derivation. The sequent z 1 , . . . , z m → x could either be an axiom (and then n = 1, z 1 = x, and trivially x ⇒ * G x) or be derived by one of the Buszkowski's rules. Since x ∈ N ∪ Σ, the only possible rules are (E) and (7 p ).
If z 1 , . . . , z m → x is derived using (E):
. . z m . If the last rule in the derivation is (7 p ), then we get z 1 , . . . , z m , f p → c p . Trace the type in the succedent. Since the antecedent doesn't contain c p , b p , or a p , sequents with these types in the succedent could not appear as axioms, and the only ways to derive such sequents are represented by the following schema (the arrows go from goal to premises):
Therefore, the sequent z 1 , . . . , z m , f p → c p is derived in the following way: several (possibly zero) applications of (6 p ), then (5 ′ p ), then several (4 ′ p ), then several (2 ′ p ), then (1 ′ p ). Finally, on top of this last (1 ′ p ) rule we again get a sequent with x in the succedent. The whole derivation has the following form. Here * means several consecutive applications of the same rule, and ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ n = z 1 , . . . , z m . ∆1 → y1 . . . ∆ k → w . . . ∆n → yn y1, . . . , y k−1 , v1, v2, y k+1 , . . . , yn → x e p , y1, . . . , y k−1 , v1, v2, y k+1 , . . . , yn → a p (1 ′ p ) y p k+1 , . . . , y p n , e p , y1, . . . , y k−1 , v1, v2 → a p (2 ′ p ) * w p , y p k+1 , . . . , y p n , e p , y1, . . . ,
Here rule (1 ′ p ) introduces e p , (2 ′ p ) moves e p to the left and marks y i as y p i , (3 ′ p ) actually applies the production (v 1 v 2 ⇒ w), which is possible, since v 1 , v 2 is now on the edge of the antecedent, (4 ′ p ) continues the movement, and finally (5 ′ p ), (6 p ), and (7 p ) move the letters backwards, unmark them and return the antecedent to x.
By induction hypothesis, y
We notice that the first type of productions of the binary grammar is handled much easier than the second one. This is due to the fact that in the first case we simulate standard context-free derivation, while in the second case the production is not context-free and even not context-sensitive.
⇒ Proceed by induction on ⇒ * G . For the base case (x ⇒ * G x) the corresponding sequent (x → x) is an axiom.
If the last production is w ⇒ v 1 v 2 :
, and by (cut) we obtain
The cut rule is admissible in L * + R by Theorem 2.
For the v 1 v 2 ⇒ w case, i.e., the last production is applied like this:
the derivation is as follows (here p = (v 1 v 2 ⇒ w), x ): The sequent on the top is derivable by inductive hypothesis.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1 and Theorem 3.
Since there exist undecidable recursively enumerable languages, Theorem 3 now yields the following result: Note that the \ connective is not used in the construction, so we've actually obtained undecidability for L * / + R 0 .
Undecidability of !L *
We prove undecidability of !L * by encoding L * + R derivations in this calculus.
In order to do that, we first prove a technical proposition which is actually a relevant version of deduction theorem. If R is a set of Buszkowski's rules, let
If B = {B 1 , . . . , B n } is a finite set of formulae, let !Γ B = !B 1 , . . . , !B n . (The order of the elements in B doesn't matter, since !Γ B will appear in left-hand sides of !L * sequents, and in !L * we have the (perm 1,2 ) rules.)
Note that since we don't have the weakening rule, we cannot always take B = G R , as in the usual form of deduction theorem. Generally, with B = G R the "only if" statement is false. For example, !(r /(p / q)), s → s is not derivable in !L * , but s → s is indeed derivable in L * + R for any R. This happens because this particular Buszkowski's rule, encoded by r /(p / q), is not relevant to s → s.
Proof. ⇒ Proceed by induction.
If Π → A is an axiom (A → A), just take B = ∅. If A = B / C, and Π → A is obtained using the (→ /) rule from Π, C → B, then take the same B and apply the same rule:
Then for !Γ B , Π → A we have the following derivation in !L * , where * means several applications of the rules in any order.
Finally, Π → A can be obtained by application of Buszkowski's rules (B 1 ) or (B 2 ). In the first case, A = r, Π = Π 1 , Π 2 , and both Π 1 → p and Π 2 → q are derivable in L * +R. Thus by induction hypothesis we get !L * ⊢ !Γ B1 , Π 1 → p and !L * ⊢ !Γ B2 , Π 2 → q for some B 1 , B 2 ⊆ G R . Moreover, (r / q) / p ∈ G R . Now take B = B 1 ∪ B 2 ∪ {(r / q) / p} and enjoy the following derivation for !Γ B , Π 1 , Π 2 → r in !L * :
In the (B 2 ) case, A = r, and we have !Γ B ′ , Π, q → p in the induction hypothesis for some B ′ ⊆ G R . Let B = B ′ ∪ {r /(p / q)} (recall that r /(p / q) ∈ G R ), and proceed like this:
⇐ For deriving sequents of the form !Γ B , Π → A, where Π, A, and B do not contain the exponential, one can use a simpler calculus than !L * :
Moreover, the (! →) rule is interchangeable with the others in the following ways:
And the same, if D appears inside ∆ 1 or Π. Finally, consecutive applications of (! →) are always interchangeable.
After applying these transformations, we achieve a derivation where (! →) is applied immediately after applying (/ →) with the same active type (the other case, when it is applied after the axiom to p, is impossible, since B is always a subset of G R , and the latter doesn't contain sole variables). In other words, applications of (! →) appear only in the following two situations:
A by induction on the above canonical derivation. For the case of axiom or applications of rules (→ /) and (/ →) we just apply the same rules in L * + R, so the only interesting case is (! →). Consider the two possible situations.
In the (r / q) / p case, by induction hypothesis we get L * + R ⊢ Π → p and L * + R ⊢ ∆ 1 , r / q, ∆ 2 → A, and then we develop the following derivation in L * + R (recall that (cut) is admissible there):
In the case of r /(p / q), the derivation looks like this:
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
Now we can return to our main claim.
of Theorem 1. Take R 0 from Theorem 4 and suppose that !L * is decidable. Then we can present an algorithm that solves the derivability problem for L * + R 0 . Namely, for a sequent Π → A we search through all subsets B ⊆ G R (and there is a finite number of them) and test derivability of !Γ B , Π → A in !L * . By Theorem 5, Π → A is derivable in L * + R 0 if and only if at least one of these tests succeeds. This contradicts Theorem 4. Therefore !L * is undecidable.
Since we never used \ in the construction, we get undecidability for !L * / .
As discussed before, it is not sufficient to check derivability only for B = G R , since it could violate the relevant nature of the system.
A Decidable Fragment of !L *
Undecidability of !L * is somewhat unfortunate, because this calculus is liguistically motivated (see Section 2). However, in our examples ! was applied only to primitive types (np). If we consider only sequents with this restriction, the situation is different: the derivability problem becomes decidable. Moreover, it belongs to NP.
Let's call the size of a formula A (denoted by |A|) the total number of variable and connective occurrences in A. More formally, |A| is defined recursively: |p| = 1 for p ∈ Var, |A \ B| = |B / A| = |A| + |B| + 1, |!A| = |A| + 1. The size of a sequent A 1 , . . . , A n → B is |A 1 | + . . . + |A n | + |B|.
In the pure Lambek calculus, the size of any derivation is necessarily bounded by the size of the goal sequent. In our case, a sequent could have derivations of arbitrary size due to uncontrolled application of permutation rules: two consecutive applications of (perm 1 ) and (perm 2 ) (with the same formula at the same places) do nothing with the sequent, but increase the derivation size. Nevertheless, the following lemma shows that every sequent has a derivation of quadratic size.
Lemma 2. If the sequent Π → C is derivable in !L * and ! in this sequent is applied only to variables, then this sequent has a derivation of size less than 12n 2 + 3n, where n is the size of Π → C.
Recall that (cut) is not included in the system, all derivations are cut-free.
Proof. We represent the derivation of Π → C as a tree. The leaves of the tree are instances of axioms, and the inner nodes correspond to applications of rules. Rules (/ →) and (\ →) form branching points of the tree. The number of leaves is equal to the number of branching points plus one.
Let's call (perm 1,2 ) and (contr) structural rules; other rules are logical ones. Each logical rule introduces exactly one connective into the goal sequent Π → C. The key note here is the fact that, since only variables can appear under !, the contraction rule (contr) cannot merge two connectives. Therefore, since the total number of connectives is less than n, the number of logical rule applications is also less than n.
Each branching point corresponds to an application of a logical rule, whence the number of branching points is also less than n. Therefore, in the tree there are no more than n axiom leaves, and each axiom introduces two variable occurrences. Let's trace these occurrences down the tree. Each occurrence either traces to an occurrence in the goal sequent, or disappears (gets merged with another occurrence) in an application of (contr). Thus, the number of (contr) applications is less than the total number of variable occurrences in axiom leaves, and, therefore, less then 2n.
Finally, we limit the number of (perm 1,2 ) applications. As said above, a block of consecutive applications of (perm 1,2 ) can include an arbitrarily large number of (perm 1,2 ) applications. However, we can always reduce it. Each this holds also in the so-called strong sense, i.e., context-free grammars and Lambek grammars can assign the same Montague-style semantic values to the words derived [6] [8] . The question is what class of grammars in the Chomsky hierarchy corresponds to grammars based on the fragment of !L * , restricted as in Theorem 6, and could one add Montague-style semantics to such grammars.
